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ABSTRACT 
 
VIRGINIA PAIGE MULLER: What Right Did Russia Have?  Russian Intervention in 
Georgia and Moldova in the early 1990s 
(Under the direction of Dr. Graeme Robertson) 
 
In the early 1990s conflict broke out in several former Soviet republics as different 
regions vied for independence.  Abkhazia in Georgia and Transdniestria in Moldova were 
two such regions.  The Russian government initially declared neutrality in both cases but 
soon changed course, instead supporting Abkhaz and Transdniestrian separatists.  Several 
months later, the Russian government changed course and announced the installment of 
Russian peacekeeping troops in Georgia and Moldova.  The intent of these peacekeeping 
missions was ostensibly to support the cessation of armed fighting and promote resolution of 
the disputes, but Russia’s involvement in both cases was never as neutral or conflict-
resolution based as peacekeeping missions should be.  This thesis will look at Russia’s 
rationale for intervening in the Abkhaz/Georgia and Transdniestrian/Moldovan conflicts in 
order to better understand Russia’s justification for getting involved.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In the early 1990s conflict broke out in several former Soviet republics as different 
regions vied for independence.  Abkhazia in Georgia and Transdniestria in Moldova were 
two such regions.  The Russian government initially declared neutrality in both cases but 
soon changed course, instead supporting Abkhaz and Transdniestrian separatists.  Several 
months later, the Russian government changed course again and announced the installment 
of Russian peacekeeping troops in Georgia and Moldova.  The intent of these peacekeeping 
missions was ostensibly to support the cessation of armed fighting and promote resolution of 
the disputes, but Russia’s involvement in both cases was never as neutral or conflict-
resolution based as peacekeeping missions should be.  This thesis will look at Russia’s 
rationale for intervening in the Abkhaz/Georgian and Transdniestrian/Moldovan conflicts in 
order to better understand Russia’s justification for getting involved.   
Understanding Moscow’s rationale is important because the West is quick to ascribe 
Russian intervention in the former Soviet Union to a Russian tendency toward empire 
building and power mongering.  This thesis neither attempts to prove these theories wrong 
nor defend the Russian government’s actions.  Instead, it aims to more fully explain Russia’s 
justifications for delving into what could be considered internal political matters in both 
Georgia and Moldova.  Understanding whether or not Russia’s actions constituted 
peacekeeping or intervention is another important aspect of this thesis.  Categorizing Russian 
actions is crucial to a better comprehension of Russia’s involvement in each conflict, because 
while Russia called its intervention peacekeeping, others saw it as forceful intervention 
2intended to influence the outcome in Russia’s favor.  Based on theoretical and situational 
information, I conclude that Russian involvement in Georgia/Abkhazia and 
Transdniestria/Moldova was neither solely forceful intervention nor peacekeeping, but rather 
a combination of the two.   
The body of this thesis consists of five chapters that deal primarily with Russia’s 
involvement in the early stages of each conflict—roughly from 1992-1994.  Chapter 2 traces 
the development of the conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia.  Although the most recent 
conflict erupted out of the changing political landscape of the late 1980s and early 1990s, the 
region’s secessionist goals have a long history.  The Soviet government’s promises of 
autonomy, later rescinded, fed into Abkhaz aspirations for self-determination.  When fighting 
broke out in early 1992, the Russian government exacerbated the conflict by taking a pro-
Abkhaz stance early on, offering such support to the Abkhaz that the Georgian government, 
on the brink of defeat, was forced to concede to several Russian demands.  After Georgia 
agreed to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia changed its approach 
towards the conflict and instituted its peacekeeping troops.  This chapter also discusses the 
rather minimal international attention given to this conflict.  Although Russian support for 
the Abkhaz has allegedly stopped, Russian-Georgian relations remain shaky today as a result 
of the Russian government’s initial sponsorship of Abkhaz separatism. 
Chapter 3 tracks the progression of the conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria.  
This conflict developed in a similar fashion to that in Abkhazia/Georgia, historical 
differences not withstanding.  The connection between Transdniestria and Russia dates to the 
late 18th century, and this long history has allowed a large Russian population to establish 
itself in Moldova.  When fighting broke out between Moldovan and Transdniestrians, 
3Russia’s close ethnic ties to Transdniestria equaled stronger Russian support for the 
Transdniestrians than the Moldavians.  In fact, it has been argued that Transdniestria would 
not have been able to support itself for so long after declaring independence from Moldova 
without the Russian government’s support.  After Moldova conceded some of its sovereignty 
to Russia by allowing Russian troops a semi-permanent Moldovan base and the institution of 
a Russian peacekeeping contingent in Moldova, Russian support for the Transdniestrian 
cause continued.  The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did play 
a role in Transdniestria/Moldova at this point, although Russia remained the major outside 
power. 
Chapter 4 provides basic information about peacekeeping and intervention theory in 
an attempt to establish the true nature of Russia’s involvement in Georgia and Moldova.  
When Russian troops first engaged in each conflict, their support for separatist forces 
challenged Georgian and Moldovan sovereignty.  Such activities gave the indication that 
Russia intended for its involvement to change the makeup of its near abroad and create 
alliances with governments that would be friendly—and acquiescent—to Russian policy.  
After this initial support, however, Russia changed tactics and initiated peacekeeping 
operations in both Georgia and Moldova.  These operations began in response to Georgian 
and Moldovan concessions to Russian policy goals, the purpose of which was to allow 
Russia to retain substantial influence in its near abroad while simultaneously engaging in a 
type of intervention that would be more favorably received in the rest of the world.   
Chapter 5 addresses the central questions of this thesis: Russia’s rationale for 
involvement in these conflicts, the nature of that involvement, and its evolution.  Sending 
Russian troops and support—initially for Abkhazian and Transdniestrian separatists and then 
4as “peacekeeping” forces that pledged to help find a solution to each conflict—allowed 
Russia to stay involved in a region the Kremlin felt should remain in its sphere of influence.  
Russia’s activities also enabled the Russian government to implement its own foreign policy 
goals, including Georgian membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
and the placement of a semi-permanent military force in Moldova.  The achievement of these 
objectives insured Russia’s influence in the near abroad for the foreseeable future.  Russian 
involvement in these conflicts provided a mechanism by which Russia could protect its own 
borders and other geographically and strategically important interests while trying to prove 
that, even though the Soviet Union had collapsed, Russia remained an important power in the 
world system.  This chapter also discusses how Russia’s involvement in both of these 
conflicts—especially its deviating nature—was a result of the changing status of internal 
Russian politics.  As the government attempted to redefine and establish itself after the 
Soviet Union collapsed, different groups within the Russian government fought each other 
for power and influence.  These scuffles, centered on the Ministries of Defense and Foreign 
Affairs, were largely responsible for Russia’s fickle policies in the early days of each 
conflict.     
Chapter 6 looks at the continuing impact of Russian involvement in these conflicts on 
Russo-Georgian and Russo-Moldovan relations.  While Russian troops are still stationed in 
both countries, new governments with different alliances, building tensions, and lack of 
funding endanger Russia’s prospects for furthering the long term, influential relationships it 
hoped to foster with Georgia and Moldova.  In addition, this chapter looks at whether or not 
Russia’s activities in Georgia and Moldova have accomplished the goals Russia hoped they 
would, or if the Kremlin’s policy towards these two conflicts was misguided and therefore 
5ineffective.  Could Russia have retained power and influence in the region without sending 
troops to Georgia and Moldova?  This chapter concludes that Russia could have engendered 
as much influence among former Soviet republics had it never interceded militarily in the 
Georgian and Moldovan conflicts.  This is true because Russia, which claims to be the best 
suited for intervention in either conflict because of its knowledge and understanding of the 
region, could have used its expertise as an advisor for outside parties that are working to 
resolve the ongoing conflicts, or as an independent negotiator working on its own to resolve 
the strife in either country.  
A few clarifications are necessary before continuing.  First, the word “Russia” as it is 
used throughout this thesis refers to the Russian government unless otherwise specified.  One 
could look to many parts of Russian society for rationale for Russia’s involvement in Georgia 
and Moldova.  This thesis focuses on the Russian government’s explanations and rationale 
because the government is primarily responsible for Russia’s policy towards other 
governments.  Second, there were several regional conflicts that erupted in the wake of the 
Soviet Union’s collapse.  Regions of Georgia and Tajikistan declared independence, and 
conflict sprung up between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.  
This thesis focuses on just two of these regional conflicts because of space constraints and 
the similarities that exist between both the development of fighting in the separatist regions 
and the relations between the Georgian/Moldovan governments and Russia.   
It is important to note the contribution this thesis makes to the existing body of 
literature.  Existing studies discuss Russia’s intervention in the conflicts in Georgia and 
Moldova.  Most of these studies, however, look at Russian involvement from the perspective 
of Russia’s use of peacekeeping in its near abroad, or the way Russia has tailored the use of 
6peacekeeping operations to fit particular foreign policy goals.  The main intent of this thesis, 
on the other hand, is to study the Russian government’s justification for its actions in the 
conflicts in Georgia and Moldova and to see how those decisions have affected Russia’s 
relations with both countries.  Russia’s use of forceful intervention and peacekeeping is a 
factor in the discussion; rather than being the main focus, however, the nature of Russian 
intervention in these conflicts is just one component of the argument.   
This thesis centers on the conflicts in Abkhazia/Georgia and Transdniestria/Moldova.  
However, the policy route Russia chose in its involvement in both countries, as well as 
conclusions about those policy decisions that are drawn in this thesis, are not unique to the 
situations in described herein.  The study and evaluation of Russian intervention in these two 
cases provides a useful framework from which to view Russia’s foreign policy after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and today as well.  Looking at Russia’s response to the conflicts 
in Georgia and Moldova reveal that in the early 1990s the Russian government was driven by 
internally-competing players who were trying to simultaneously develop policy; gain 
Yeltsin’s favor; and redefine Russia, both internally and externally.  In addition, the study of 
Russia’s justification for its involvement in Georgia and Moldova highlights the foundation 
of Russia’s foreign policy goals in the early 1990s and today: the desire to retain power and 
influence in Russia’s near abroad and the rest of the world; the necessity to protect Russia’s 
borders from physical and strategic dangers (i.e. the potential influx of unfriendly forces and 
the continuing encroachment of the West); and the protection of Russians and Russian 
interests, regardless of the fact that they may lie outside Russia’s defined borders.  Russia’s 
response to the conflicts that erupted in Georgia and Moldova in the early 1990s, then, is a 
7microcosm for the development and execution of at least a portion of Russian foreign policy 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union.     
Chapter 2: The Conflict in Abkhazia 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, the republics that were part of the U.S.S.R. 
suddenly could declare the independence that many of them had been craving.  This did not 
mean that the former Soviet Republics moved forward without problems.  Indeed, the first 
chance in decades that disparate nationalities had for sovereignty made some conflicts almost 
inevitable—especially in republics in which tension had existed during the Soviet era.   
The Republic of Georgia was no exception.  When the ultra-nationalist Round Table- 
Free Georgia Party handily won in the 1990 election, ethnic Abkhazians nationals living in 
Georgia became increasingly concerned that their culture, language, and way of life would be 
subordinate to that of the Georgians in power.  As a result, the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet 
declared independence for the republic in July 1992.1 Georgia, not wanting to lose a part of 
its territory—especially one in which 45% of the citizens were Georgians, while only 17.8% 
were Abkhaz2— engaged its military in Abkhazia in an attempt to retain Abkhazia.  This 
section of the paper will document historical incentives for Abkhazia’s secession and a look 
at Russia’s role in the early years of the conflict. 
 
Abkhazia’s Historical Incentives 
Georgia’s newfound independence provided Abkhazia with the opportunity to secede, 
if only because the former Soviet region as a whole was rife with change in the early 1990s.  
 
1 Catherine Dale, “The Case of Abkhazia (Georgia).”  In Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in 
Eurasia, ed. by Lena Johnson and Clive Archer, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996: 122.  
 
2 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 128.  
9Abkhazia’s history as a part of Georgia and the Soviet Union, as well as Abkhaz leaders’ 
close relationship with the collapsing Soviet Communist Party, also provided justification for 
the Abkhaz leaders’ actions.   
Abkhazia see-sawed between autonomy and subjection to the Georgian rule that 
began when the Soviet Union formed.  Abkhazia developed stronger ties with Russia and the 
Communist Party throughout the Soviet period.  In 1921 Abkhazia was its own republic 
within the Soviet Union; in fact, it was the constitution written in 1925 when Abkhazia was 
an independent republic that formed the basis for its secession from Georgia in 1992.  While 
Abkhazia may have been autonomous in the early 1920s, however, it was soon forced to 
sustain treaty relations with Georgia.   By 1931 Abkhazia was an autonomous republic within 
Georgia, and Stalin soon forced Abkhazia to become part of Georgia.  As relations between 
Abkhazia and Russia improved, Abkhazia made an attempt in 1978 to become part of the 
Russian republic instead of remaining within Georgia’s borders.  While this failed, the 
central Communist Government in Moscow implemented a policy in Georgia that assured 
Abkhazians a larger-than-proportional share of power in Georgia’s government.3
Dov Lynch states that “state-building projects” in Abkhazia “are based on the 
position that the current…status represents…the latest phase in a long historical tradition” 
reaching back over 12 centuries.  Lynch quotes the Abkhaz foreign minister as commenting 
on the fact that “‘no matter the form, Abkhaz statehood has remained intact.’  Lynch 
concludes that “the…rhetoric of the de facto state strengthens [Abkhazia’s]…claim to 
 
3 Dale, 121-122. 
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absolute sovereignty [because] any compromise would be seen as an injustice in the present 
and a violation of the very movement of history.”4
The Abkhaz nation’s desire to declare independence was based on historical 
precedent as well as the desire to retain its cultural and linguistic heritage as separate entities 
in Georgia.  In fact, the Abkhaz desire for ethnic autonomy was fed by old Soviet practices as 
much as their claims to political sovereignty.  As the Soviet Union’s government created 
republics in its early days, it often did so according to ethnic borders and populations, 
creating regions with strong nationalist tendencies.  As more nationally/ethnically-based 
republics were born, so were conflicts created as nationalities competed with each other for 
power and influence.5 Tension between Abkhaz and Georgian nationals was evident in 1989 
as heightened Georgian nationalism manifested itself in a “virulent anti-Abkhaz” press 
campaign.  When Georgia endeavored in July 1989 to build a Tbilisi University campus in 
Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia, the Abkhaz literally took up arms against the project.  An 
anti-Georgian demonstration in Tbilisi, also in 1989, invoked a strong response from the 
Georgian government as well.6
It is clear that the conflict between Abkhazia and Georgia in the early 1990s was 
hardly a sudden eruption in a republic that had been peaceful up to that point.  The Abkhaz 
craving for independence is a long-standing one, encouraged by promises and opportunities 
that were honed during the Soviet era.  The desire to preserve the Abkhaz cultural and 
national identity was just as time-honored.  A sense of Georgian nationalism, which 
increased as the Soviet Union crumbled, added undoubtedly a sense of urgency to 
 
4 Lynch, “Separatist States and Post-Soviet Conflicts,” International Affairs 78, no. 4 (2002): 837.  
 
5 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 129.  
 
6 Ibid., 128.  
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Abkhazia’s attempts to protect their heritage and way of life.  As will be seen in the next 
section, Abkhazia’s fight for sovereignty was aided, at least for a time, by the newly 
independent Russian government.  This aid undoubtedly made Abkhaz resistance more 
effective than it would have been had the Abkhaz been fighting the Georgians on their own.   
 
Russia’s Role  
Abkhazia owes much of its existence as a semi-autonomous republic to assistance 
from the Russian Federation provided in the early days of the conflict.7 Although Russia 
later changed its support to favor resolution, its role in 1992 favored the Abkhaz separatists.  
Abkhaz soldiers fought the Georgians with the help of Russian equipment, and Russian 
citizens.  As S Neil MacFarlane points out, “There was no effort to stop [Russian citizens] 
from entering Abkhazia even though their purpose was known.”8 The combination of 
Russian artillery, troops, citizens and the fact that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
was at the helm of Russia’s activities in Abkhazia showed that the Russian government had 
an abiding interest, at least in the beginning, in establishing Abkhazia’s survival as an 
autonomous state in 1992.9 Russia’s support for the Abkhaz separatists was further 
underlined when Sergei Leonenko, a lieutenant-colonel in the Russian army, confirmed that 
“official Russia was providing moral support and training” to Abkhaz troops fighting in the 
conflict.10 
7 Lynch, “Separatist States,”  846.   
 
8 MacFarlane, 522.  
 
9 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 131.  
 
10 Dale, 126.  
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Russia’s role in the conflict in Abkhazia would be less confusing if Russia’s policy 
towards had not changed so drastically.  After assisting the Abkhaz in fighting Georgian 
troops in early 1992, the Russian parliament called for a Russian peacekeeping force to be 
installed in Abkhazia in September 1992.11 As was mentioned previously, one of the core 
principles of any peacekeeping force is neutrality, as well as an international or regional 
mandate.  When its parliament called for a Russian peacekeeping force in Abkhazia, this 
force was clearly not neutral, nor did it have a mandate from anyone other than the Russian 
government.12 It is at this point, then, that one begins to wonder how the Russian 
government justified its actions in Georgia as a true peacekeeping mission, when so much of 
what forces did suggested a more favorable attitude towards the Abkhaz or, in some cases, 
towards the Russian government’s own foreign policy objectives.   
In a recent interview, then Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zurabishvili 
commented to European Union officials that “[t]oday there’s no confidence left in Georgia 
towards Russia.”13 This lack of confidence is due, in large part, to Russia’s actions in the 
Abkhaz-Georgian conflict in 1992 and 1993.  The Russian government brokered several 
cease-fires between the Abkhaz and Georgian fighters and soon afterwards, in at least one 
case, assisted Abkhaz fighters in breaking the ceasefire and winning some military battles.14 
Following its self-declared role as peacekeeper in this conflict, Russian forces proceeded to 
 
11 Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition?  The Rise, Fall and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military 
Interventionism, 1973-1996. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999:319.    
 
12 Russia had no mandate until 1994, when the Commonwealth of Independent States “legitimized this 
deployment as a regional peacekeeping operation based on the consent of the parties” (MacFarlane, 514).  
Russia’s dominant role in the CIS, however, leads one to question the…actual legitimacy that should be 
accorded to Russia’s actions.   
 
13 Philip Shishkin, “Georgia Asks EU, US for Help on Ties to Russia,” Wall Street Journal, 2 March 
2005: A14.  
 
14 MacFarlane, 514.  
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deny help to the Georgians because Georgia was not a member of the CIS.15 Withholding 
this assistance allowed Moscow to underscore the benefits of CIS membership—in this case, 
military assistance.  This tactic also highlighted what was at stake for Russia in its 
involvement: continued influence in the near abroad.  The fighting between the Georgians 
and Abkhaz continued until, as Catherine Dale says,  
The state [of Georgia] was in danger of total collapse.  It was at this 
stage that Shevardnadze went to Moscow to plead for Russia’s help and 
caved in on several major components of Russia’s agenda…Notably, 
Georgia signed the CIS accord and agreed in principle to a military 
cooperation agreement that would render more or less permanent the 
Russian military presence in Georgia, as well as guaranteeing substantial 
Russian influence in Georgia’s military.  It was only when these objectives 
were attained that Russia interposed its peacekeepers and provided the 
military assistance necessary to quell the rebellion…16 
Although the 27 July 1993 Sochi Agreement—brokered by Russia—outlined plans for a 
cease-fire and international peacekeeping troops,17 it wasn’t until Georgian President leader, 
Eduard Shevardnadze acquiesced to Russia’s foreign policy goals (as Dale describes above) 
that Russian activities in Abkhazia changed course.  The Russian government promised to 
stop providing aid to the Abkhaz separatist forces, instead pledging to help the Georgians 
fight against the Abkhaz.18 Moscow followed by imposing sanctions on the Abkhaz in an 
attempt to force an end to the fighting.19 Despite these actions, however, which appeared to 
reverse Russia’s stance on the Abkhaz conflict (while continuing to play a distinctly non-
neutral role), S. Neil MacFarlane highlights the fact that “Russia has not mounted the kind of 
 
15 Dale, 128.   
 
16 Dale, 522.  
 
17 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 136 
 
18 Ibid., 138.  
 
19 Ibid., 141 
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pressure on the insurgent parties necessary to push them towards a compromise…”20 While 
Russia’s rationale for its involvement in the Abkhaz conflict will be studied more closely in a 
subsequent section, the point here is that throughout the Abkhaz conflict Russia provided 
biased help to both parties involved—first the Abkhaz, then the Georgians—while 
simultaneously calling itself a peacekeeping force.   
Russia’s objectives in its peacekeeping mission, which continues today, have not 
been helped by (and indeed contributed to) both Abkhazia and Georgia’s expectations.  The 
Abkhaz, on the one hand, were relying on the peacekeepers to enable Abkhazia to remain an 
independent state, while the Georgians intended for the peacekeepers to “ensure the return of 
Georgian internally displaced persons and to restore Georgia territorial integrity in 
Abkhazia.”21 Russia’s “peacekeeping” force did not embody traditional peacekeeping 
characteristics; neither, however, does it appear that either Georgia or Abkhazia, in accepting 
this peacekeeping mission, did so with the expectation that Russia would conduct itself as a 
neutral party.   
At various moments since Russia became involved in the conflict between Georgia 
and Abkhazia, Russia, Georgia, and the international community have demonstrated either a 
desire to improve the situation or have shown support for Russia’s efforts.  For example, 
Russia declared its involvement in Georgia as a peacekeeping force using troops that had 
been in Georgia for some time and so had ties to Abkhaz fighters.  This obviously made 
impartiality difficult.  As the peacekeeping mission has continued, however, S. Neil 
MacFarlane writes that “the Russian military…made considerable efforts to train units for 
such missions…and is now deploying units from outside the region.  The level of 
 
20 MacFarlane, 522.  
 
21 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 131-132.   
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professionalism among Russian forces deployed in the region has thus increased.”22 Despite 
the questionable nature of its “peacekeeping” mission in Abkhazia, the Russian military has 
at least attempted to ensure that its soldiers are properly trained for their mission. 
It is largely due to Russia’s biased support of the conflict, as well as its hegemonic 
role in the region, that Georgia has been unhappy with Russian participation.  At the same 
time, though Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze expressed his desire for Russian 
troops to leave Georgia throughout the early years of the conflict, he also insisted that they 
not withdraw entirely, as doing so would make it much harder for the Georgian military to 
rebuild.23 Scholars such as S Neil MacFarlane have commented on Russia’s willingness to 
become involved in a conflict that the rest of the world might very well have ignored,24 and 
Catherine Dale notes that in July 1994 the UN agreed that the United Nations Mission to 
Georgia (UNOMIG) would not be responsible for commanding “CIS” (Russian) troops on 
the ground in Georgia.  UNOMIG would be monitoring Russian troop activities, however, 
which made “it clear that these CIS forces are answerable in some way to the international 
community.”25 These facts do not relieve Russia of responsibility for its actions, but they do 
show that Georgia and the international community have acknowledged Russia’s 
involvement in Abkhazia/Georgia and have in some ways legitimized the Russian military’s 
presence there.  
 
22 MacFarlane, 519.  
 
23 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 136.   
 
24 MacFarlane, 520.  
 
25 Dale, 130-131.  
Chapter 3—The Conflict in Moldova 
 
The conflict between Moldova and Transdniestria began for reasons similar to those 
that provoked problems between Abkhazia and Georgia.  As the Moldovan government 
wrestled with decisions including whether or not to cement ties with Romania, to whom 
Moldova has been historically close, the largely Russian speaking, Soviet-allied population 
in the Transdniestrian region of Moldova became nervous that it would lose its identity and 
its support from Russia.26 
Just as in Abkhazia, Soviet/Russian support for Transdniestria goes back for 
centuries, beginning with the 1792 cession of the western bank of the Dniestr River from the 
Ottoman to Russian Empire.  The Dniestr River remained an important Russian border 
throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, and the Moldovan Republic was created around the 
Dniestr in 1924—“in part,” Jeff Chinn writes, “symbolizing Soviet claims on the land lost to 
Romania.  Consequently,” he concludes, “the left bank [of the Dniestr] has never known 
either independence or Romanian control, having been under Russian or Soviet rule for its 
entire modern history.”27 
These strong historical ties to Russia, when combined with the “Romanizing” that 
was taking place in Moldova in the late 1980s and early 1990s, convinced the 
Transdniestrians to declare sovereignty in 1989 and to secede from Moldova on 2 September 
 
26 Lynch, “Separatist States,” 839.  
 
27 Jeff Chinn, “The Case of Transdniestr (Moldova),”  In Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in 
Eurasia, Edited by Lena Johnson and Clive Archer, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996: 104.  
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1991.28 The Moldovan government has fought to keep Transdniestria under its jurisdiction, 
because it does not want to lose territory.  Equally important, however, is the fact that in 
1989, Transdniestria comprised a third of the industrial capabilities of what is otherwise an 
agriculturally-based economy.  This high industrial concentration, combined with 
Transdniestria’s close ties to Russia (and therefore Russia’s economic infrastructure, which 
Moldova was cut off from when it ceased to be a Soviet Republic) added extra worth to 
Transdniestria in the early 1990s.29 So close were Transdniestria and Russian economic ties, 
in fact, that “by June [1992], Russia had…effectively imposed an economic blockade on 
Moldova, ceasing all deliveries of food and fuel.”30 
Transdniestria’s connection to Russia is not solely economic, however.  When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, a large portion of the Soviet 14th Army—both troops and 
equipment—remained in Transdniestria.31 These troops formed the basis of Russia’s support 
for the Transdniestrians during fighting with Moldova after fighting broke out in early 1992.  
Between March and June 1992 (when, according to Jeff Chinn, the most intense fighting 
occurred), the 14th Army supplied the Transdniestrians with as many as 20,000 guns,32 not to 
mention training troops and bolstering Transdniestrian forces with Russian soldiers. 33 Even 
 
28 Ibid., 104, 107.  
 
29 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 111.  
 
30 Ibid., 117.  
 
31 “Moldova: Are the Russian Troops Really Leaving?”  Washington DC: Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, 25 September 2001: 2.  
 
32 Chinn, 108.  
 
33 Lynch, Russian Peacekeeping Strategies, 116.  
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before March 1992, however, the Soviet/Russian government used the 14th Army to bolster 
the Transdniestrian forces so that they could repel Moldovan attacks.34 
Russian support for the Transdniestrians in the early stages of this conflict could not 
have been much greater.  However, just as occurred in the fracas in Georgia/Abkhazia, when 
the Moldovan government made a few concessions, Russia at least verbally promised to 
switch allegiances.  The Moldovan government did not, as the Georgian government did, 
have to agree to join the CIS to win Russia’s approval.  When then-Moldovan president 
Snegur realized that his troops could never win as long as the Transdniestrians had Russia’s 
help, he conceded to some of Russia’s demands.35 One major concession allowed the 
Russian military to place a permanent contingent of Russian soldiers on the western bank of 
the Dniestr River.36 Following this agreement, Russian, Moldovan, and Transdniestrian 
“peacekeeping” troops, dubbed the “Joint Control Commission,” were distributed throughout 
the conflicted region.37 Moldova secured additional aid from Russia when it joined the CIS 
in April 1993.38 
Russia’s deployment of peacekeeping troops and its agreements with the Moldovan 
government did not, however, end Russian support for Transdniestria.  Dov Lynch highlights 
some of the “state-building” aid the Russians provided by quoting Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin: “We provide help to [the Transdniestrians] as much as we can.  Bread, glass, many 
things in general.  We are helping them directly.”  Lynch goes on to elaborate that  
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within the ‘peacekeeping’ buffer zone, the Dnestr leadership 
established a banking system, postal services and border controls, and the 
Russian government extended technical credit to support Dnestr industry.  
The Russian Central Bank extended substantial credits to [Transdniestria] 
in early 1993 to buy grain and flour.39 
This aid continued even after the Russian government established a “peacekeeping” mission 
in Moldova.  The Transdniestrian Army sustained confidence in Russian help as well, as 
evidenced in an April 16, 1992 interview with Transdniestrian Army Commander Stephanye 
Kitsake in the Russian newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda. “I am convinced,” Kitsake says, “that 
without Russia…this conflict will not be solved.”40 Kitsake does not say that Russia’s 
presence ensures that the conflict will be resolved in Transdniestria’s favor, but given the 
bent of Russia’s aid up to this point, one has to wonder if this thought isn’t underlying 
Kitsake’s vote of confidence in Russia’s abilities.   
Russian involvement in this conflict mirrors its actions in Abkhazia/Georgia in the 
way that, since Russian “peacekeeping” troops have deployed to Transdniestria, Russia has 
made efforts to ally itself more closely with the Moldovan government.  Russian 
“peacekeeping” troops have, as Jeff Chinn notes, “kept…hostilities [between Transdniestria 
and Moldova] from escalating out of control,”41 and the Russian government helped iron out 
a cease-fire agreement in July 1992.  None of the parties involved were satisfied with this 
peace agreement, however.  The Transdniestrians were not even present when the cease-fire 
was drafted; Russian conservatives were angry that their government was pledging to end 
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support for this Russian-speaking population, and the Moldovan government was convinced 
that force was still the best way to bring Transdniestria back under Moldovan control.42 
The ineffective, unpopular cease-fire Russia helped broker was weakened when, in 
November 1994, Russia recalled half of its peacekeeping troops.43 This withdrawal, which 
Russia justified by saying that it could no longer afford to keep so many troops in Moldova, 
was hugely unpopular with both the Moldavians and the Transdniestrians.44 Just as both the 
Abkhaz and Georgian forces felt that Russia had an integral role in securing what each side 
wanted, so too had the Moldavians and Transdniestrians come to rely on the Russian 
government.  Ironically, both sides needed Russia for similar reasons.  Russia’s financial, 
military, and moral support for the Transdniestrians was explained earlier.  Moldova, 
partially through its entry into the CIS and the economic ties that accompanied that union, 
has become reliant on Russia for many commodities; in addition, Moldova felt that without 
Russian assistance, Transdniestria would never rejoin Moldova.45 
The international community has been present in Moldova since shortly after the 
conflict with Transdniestria began.  A group of OSCE negotiators went to Moldova in 1993 
and provided support for Moldova’s territorial claims to Transdniestria—although the OSCE 
mission also encouraged the Moldovan government to accord Transdniestria “special status” 
as a part of Moldova.  The fact that the OSCE expressed support for the Moldovan side early 
on in its involvement made both the Russians and Transdniestrians wary of overt support for 
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OSCE peacekeeping/cease-fire monitoring efforts.46 Since the OSCE arrived in Moldova, it 
has been “allowed to gather military information…investigate violent incidents and generally 
maintain a visible presence.”47 Unlike the UN mission in Georgia which was allowed to 
monitor the activities of the peacekeeping force there, however, the OSCE has no official 
involvement with Russian “peacekeeping” troops stationed in Transdniestria or Moldova.   
Russia’s actions in this conflict do not look any more like traditional peacekeeping 
missions than its activities in Abkhazia/Georgia.  However, the Russian government did at 
least attempt, initially, to stay detached from the fray.  For example, in April 1992, just after 
armed conflict erupted in Transdniestria, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared the 14th 
Army (still stationed in Transdniestria) a Russian military unit.  This was an effort by 
“Russian Defense Minister Paul Grachev and CIS Commander in Chief Yevgeni 
Shaposnikov…to maintain the neutrality of the 14th Army [as well as] prevent the Trans-
Dniestrian militia from seizing [the 14th Army’s] large weapons stockpiles.”48 Besides 
helping secure a large quantity of Soviet artillery for the Russian army, Yeltsin’s attempt to 
retain some semblance of neutrality at the beginning of the conflict showed Russia’s initial 
post-Communist desire to mind its own business.     
Elaine Holobof points out that “Moldova appealed reportedly for UN or CSCE 
troops, but when this failed had little recourse but to accept ‘peace-keeping’ forces on 
Russia’s terms.”49 The Russian government’s willingness to send troops to Moldova, while 
going against its earlier declarations of neutrality, filled a void left by the international 
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community.  Russian troops were not neutral as UN or OSCE troops might have been, but it 
seems fair to say that the international community’s failure to provide an alternative leaves 
less room for criticism of Russia’s actions.  It is logical in this situation to ask if Russia’s 
biased support has been better for the conflict than if no third party had gotten involved.  
Different people would most likely answer this question in different ways.  It seems evident, 
however, that Russia’s involvement in the conflict in Transdniestria has at least drawn 
attention to the conflict and has greater efforts to solve the clashes between the Moldavians 
and Transdniestrians.  
Chapter 4: Peacekeeping vs. Intervention 
As the preceding two chapters show, Russia’s initial activities in the conflicts in 
Georgia and Moldova supported Abkhaz and Transdniestrian separatists against the Georgian 
and Moldovan governments.  This involvement constituted a type of forceful military 
intervention, as armed Russian forces aided Abkhaz and Transdniestrian soldiers in their 
fight against the Georgian and Moldovan governments.  When the Russian government 
changed tactics, however, it declared that Russian forces present in both countries constituted 
peacekeeping forces.  Such a proclamation is troubling, however, because Russian forces did 
not adhere to basic characteristics attributed to peacekeeping operations.  The gap between 
their intentions and actions created a paradox that leads to questions about Russia’s real 
intentions in Moldova and Georgia.  If Russia wanted to be a peacekeeping presence in the 
region, why did it initially support separatist parties in each conflict?  More basically, did 
Russia really want to bring peace to Georgia and Moldova, or was it just using 
“peacekeeping” as a guise to hide behind while it continued to influence the outcome of each 
conflict in its favor?  Answering either of these questions requires a basic understanding of 
peacekeeping theory. 
While there is no universally accepted definition of peacekeeping, scholars do agree 
on crucial attributes and conditions that should be present in any peacekeeping mission.  
Peacekeeping normally falls under the jurisdiction of the United Nations, which first used the 
term in 1965.50 Most scholars acknowledge that although the UN is the most common 
sponsor for peacekeeping activities, any state or group of states can champion peacekeeping.  
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Paul F. Diehl, author of International Peacekeeping, says that “peacekeeping is used to refer 
to any international effort involving an operational component to promote the termination of 
armed conflict on the resolution of longstanding disputes.”51 Such efforts, Diehl continues, 
can involve “military action to punish an aggressor…as well as multilateral efforts at 
negotiation.”52
Military involvement in peacekeeping missions is one result of the development of 
peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping missions originally took place after a conflict ended, as states 
attempted to resolve remaining issues and transition back to peaceful, pre-conflict conditions.  
During this early stage, it was important for peacekeeping forces to “embrace…the three 
fundamental principles of consent, neutrality, and the use of force only in self-defense.”53 
When the Cold War ended and greater UN Security Council collaboration ensued, 
peacekeeping evolved to address issues involved with wars and conflicts erupting in newly 
independent states.  Even more recently, the UN has restricted peacekeeping operations to 
conflicts in which parties have “demonstrated their consent to end the fighting by meeting 
specific obligations for a comprehensive peace program.”54 In other words, in the 1990s the 
United Nations became less willing to try to force warring parties to keep peace; instead, the 
UN dedicated itself to protecting or enforcing a peace that had already been at least 
established by the conflicting factions. 
The International Peace Academy provides the most oft-cited definition of 
peacekeeping operations.  It says that peacekeeping is “the prevention, containment, 
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moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a 
peaceful third party intervention, organized and directed internationally, using multinational 
forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.”55 By adding the 
important qualification that peacekeeping forces remain neutral, this definition encapsulates 
those characteristics that are crucial to the success and international acceptance of any 
peacekeeping operation. 56 
Russia’s peacekeeping operations were ill perceived largely because of their lack of 
neutrality.  Neutrality is so central to successful peacekeeping missions that Paul Diehl 
itemizes it in his “two informal rules” of peacekeeping.  “The first [rule],” Diehl says, “is to 
never allow forces from a state involved in the conflict to participate in the action.  A second 
rule is to bar troop contribution from major power nations or their allies.”  These rules, Diehl 
explains, allow the “conflicting parties [to] regard the peacekeeping force as unbiased and 
disinterested.”57 When Russia initiated its peacekeeping operations in Georgia and Moldova, 
it had already violated both of these rules.  Russia’s previous involvement, both historically 
and in the ongoing conflicts, broke the first rule, and the fact that Russia had so recently been 
one of the world’s two superpowers violated the second.  Based on Diehl’s guidelines, then, 
Russia’s peacekeeping operations in Georgia and Moldova were bound to encounter 
problems from their inception.  These problems were compounded by Russia’s initial support 
for secessionist forces in both Abkhazia and Transdniestria. 
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The other distinguishing quality of peacekeeping operations is that they have “clear 
and detailed mandate[s].”  This is important because “a vague mandate creates problems 
when different actors have varying expectations about [a peacekeeping operation’s] scope 
and implementation.”  Lack of clarity surrounding the purpose may “lead a peacekeeping 
operation to exceed some of the basic principles of neutrality or self defense that are the 
cornerstones of peacekeeping strategy.”58 When Russia established its peacekeeping 
operations in Georgia and Moldova, it had no clear mandate from outside its own 
government.  This fueled doubt as to Russia’s true intentions, because the motives behind 
Russia’s unilaterally declared peacekeeping missions were unknown outside the Russian 
government.   
Russia’s involvement in Georgia and Moldova as a peacekeeping force was 
questionable, then, because of Russia’s initial, biased involvement in both Georgia and 
Moldova.  After supporting the Abkhaz and Transdniestrian separatists, it was difficult for 
the Russian government to convince anyone that it could be a neutral, conflict-resolution 
seeking participant.  Lack of mandate for the peacekeeping operation from anyone outside 
the Russian Federation made Russia’s true intentions susceptible as people wondered if 
Russia was using peacekeeping as a front to continue pursuing previous policies. 
If Russia’s activities in Georgia and Moldova were not true peacekeeping operations, 
one has to wonder how to categorize them.  Dmitri Trenin cites the widespread belief that 
“[d]espite Moscow’s earlier internationalist pronouncements, it has…long been argued that 
unilateral and forcible intervention…disguised as ‘peacemaking,’ was in fact an instrument 
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of imperial restoration…”59 The issue of whether or not Russia was engaging in “imperial 
restoration” in its involvement in these two conflicts will be discussed later; the important 
issue at this point is the “unilateral and forcible intervention” Trenin attributes to Moscow’s 
activities.   
Intervention is most simply defined as “interference in the affairs of others, e.g. by 
one state in the affairs of another”60 This gives the term a wide range of applicability; 
indeed, even peacekeeping is a type of intervention.  As an interventionary tactic, however, 
peacekeeping is at the opposite end of the spectrum from the militarily driven, forcible 
involvement employed by Russia at the beginning of the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.  
Russia’s actions in Georgia and Moldova during the early years of this conflict were 
unquestionably interventionary.  The problem occurs when one attempts to place these 
actions on the spectrum between peacekeeping and forceful military intervention.  The ways 
in which Russia’s involvement in these two conflicts deviated from conventional 
peacekeeping have already been outlined.  In order to decide the extent to which Russia’s 
actions constituted forceful military intervention, it is necessary to understand a bit of 
conventional intervention theory.   
In a 1968 issue of the Journal of International Affairs, James N. Rosenau presented 
one of the first detailed studies of intervention.  In his article, “The Concept of Intervention,” 
Rosenau claimed that for an action to be considered interventionary, it must contain two 
characteristics.  First, it should be “convention-breaking”; second, it should be “authority 
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oriented.”  Rosenau says that intervention occurs “whenever the form of [one international 
actor towards another] constitutes a sharp break with then-existing forms and whenever it is 
directed at changing or preserving the structure of political authority in the target society.” 61 
While Rosenau’s characteristics refer only to “intervention”, without any specification as to 
whether or not that intervention is militarily based, it seems clear that the type of intervention 
to which Rosenau refers is that which challenges the sovereignty of another party.  Such 
intervention, then, is different from interventionary peacekeeping, which does not challenge 
the sovereignty of any party, but rather attempts to restore it in a peaceful manner. 
Russia’s role in Abkhazia and Transdniestria could appear to be based on military 
intervention.  Russian troops and government assistance at the beginning of each conflict 
provided the Abkhazians and Transdniestrians with the physical, financial, and military 
wherewithal to defeat Georgian and Moldovan troops and, in doing so, to win the 
independence that the Abkhaz and Transdniestrian people sought.  In this way, Russia’s 
involvement followed conventional intervention because it affected the political—and 
physical—structure of each “target state.”  The fact that armed Russian troops were involved 
made Russia’s activities coercive as well.  Russia’s deeds in these two conflicts were 
convention-breaking because, when Russia sent its troops to Georgia and Moldova, Russia 
was infringing on the internationally recognized sovereignty of both states.   
Based on this evidence, it would be appropriate to call early Russian involvement in 
each conflict—when Russian troops supported the separatists—military intervention.  As the 
disputes continued, however, Russia’s involvement changed from a conflict-exacerbating 
force to one that was actively trying to help the warring parties come to some kind of cease-
fire agreement.  Russia called its new role “peacekeeping,” but its continued use of military 
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force, partiality, and the lack of international (and even regional, in the beginning) mandate 
leaves one hard pressed to define Russia’s activities in Abkhazia and Transdniestria as 
anything approaching conventional peacekeeping. 
The true nature of Russia’s involvement in these conflicts is obviously rather murky 
because of the Russian government’s changing intentions and, quite simply, its statements 
and actions on the ground.  Lena Johnson describes the paradox of Russian activity thus:  
Russia was not able to fulfill the role of an active and impartial third 
party.  It was seen as having a hidden agenda and an interest in maintaining 
a situation of ‘no peace, no war.’  After being accused initially of 
encouraging turmoil with the purpose of weakening the governments of 
Georgia [and] Moldova…Russia was later accused of supporting the status 
quo in order to legitimate the continued presence of Russian troops in these 
regions.62 
Regardless of Russian attempts to change course in the middle of these conflicts, then, the 
Russian government’s lack of neutrality and armed interference in what could have been 
perceived as internal Georgian and Moldovan affairs created a permanent bias towards 
Russia’s involvement in to these conflicts.   
Aggressive military intervention was not the sole component of Russia’s activities in 
Transdniestria and Abkhazia in the early 1990s.  Neither, on the other hand, did Russian 
actions estimate anything resembling conventional peacekeeping activities.  The difference 
between forceful military intervention and peacekeeping is underlined in Intervention in 
World Politics by Hedley Bull.  In his book, Bull notes that intervention is “the dictatorial or 
coercive interference…in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state…”63 The targets of 
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such intervention could be “a state’s jurisdiction over its own territory, its citizens, its right to 
determine its internal affairs or to conduct its external relations.”64
As a concept in international law, intervention is even more sharply defined as a 
negative action, as Andrew M. Dorman and Thomas G. Otte describe in Military 
Intervention: from Gunboat Diplomacy to Humanitarian Intervention. They note that 
intervention is an attempt to make one state do the bidding of another state and so is “an 
encroachment” on the target state’s “independence and political authority.”65 In his 
dissertation “The Strategic Dynamics of Military Intervention,” Stephen Gent quotes a 
similar international law definition of intervention as, “the dictatorial interference by one 
state in the affairs of another state for the purpose of either maintaining or changing the 
existing order of things.”66 These scholars’ statements emphasize the fact that “intervention” 
is most commonly understood to be forceful, military action whose intent is opposite that of 
peacekeeping.   
While peacekeeping may be a type of intervention in theory, in practice these two 
terms have different connotations and so are utilized in different ways.  In an article entitled 
“Collective Intervention,” Evan Luard points out that because intervention is seen as an 
incursion into another’s territory, states do not like to refer to a course of action they are 
taking as “interventionary.”  This term, Luard notes, is more easily applied to another state’s 
deeds.67 Peacekeeping, on the other hand, is perceived to be positive involvement because it 
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attempts to improve a conflicted situation.  Russia’s declaration of “peacekeeping” 
operations in Georgia and Moldova could, on a basic semantic level, have been an attempt to 
engender a positive reception for its activities in these two conflicts.  Given Russia’s initial 
support for Abkhaz and Transdniestrian separatist forces, however, changing the name of its 
involvement did not alter the Russian forces’ negative reputation.     
The unpopularity of Russian activities in these conflicts was not a unique situation, 
however.  Patrick Reagan and Evan Luard note that the consequences of interventionary 
actions often provoke negative responses.  “…[i]nterventions that exacerbate an existing 
conflict are bad for” just about everyone, Regan claims.  He continues that “even an 
intervention undertaken with the most humane of intentions can create a rapidly deteriorating 
situation when the policy is either ill-conceived or poorly implemented.”68 Luard, on the 
other hand, isolates single-party intervention as the type that should not be tolerated, largely 
for its self-centeredness.  The intervening power will benefit, which is the reason that this 
outside state decided to intrude on another state’s sovereignty in the first place.  Luard 
suggests that the recipient government of the interventionary action is most likely not happy 
about what is taking place; moreover, it is probable that the intervening power was not 
welcome in the first place.69 
Luard and Regan’s comments are general; their applicability to explaining Russia’s 
position in both Abkhazia/Georgia and Transdniestria/Molodova, however, is quite specific.  
As will be explained in more detail at a later point, Russia’s policy towards these conflicts 
was “ill-conceived” and “poorly implemented” due to the internal domestic situation in 
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Russia.  In addition, Russia’s intervention was single-party.  The Commonwealth of 
Independent States—of which Russia remains the most powerful member—pledged to send a 
peacekeeping force to Georgia and Moldova, but the Russian Federation was the sole 
supplier of troops.  The OSCE and UN also sent missions to Moldova and Georgia, 
respectively, in response to appeals from the Moldovan and Georgian governments.  Neither 
international organization sent enough assistance to displace the Russian forces or the 
Russians’ central role in each conflict.  As Margo Light points out, Russian “peacekeeping” 
forces were able to maintain a prominent position in both Georgia and Moldova because 
“…there were no alternative peacekeepers, since the UN was unlikely to intervene in any 
part of the former USSR, and the…OSCE, while active in mediating conflicts, does not have 
peacekeeping troops at its disposal.”70
While the international community became involved to some extent, Russia remained 
the main power on the ground—especially because, although the UN and OSCE had observer 
missions in Georgia and Moldova, they had no jurisdiction over the Russian forces.  Dov 
Lynch highlights the fact that “the presence of the UN and the OSCE in the conflict zones… 
[did] not constrain Russian policy.  In fact, this presence can be seen as…de facto justifying 
Russia’s operations…”71 Still, when the Russian government realized its activities would be 
further legitimized by a direct mandate from a regional or international organization, so it 
made a concerted effort to have the CIS recognized as a regional organization capable of 
providing such a mandate.72 The UN did, in fact, pass Resolution 937 in July 1994 to 
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officially validate the Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force in 
Abkhazia, but this is the only direct authentication Russia’s actions received from an 
international body.   
Based solely on Luard’s and Regan’s comments, then, Russian intervention in 
Georgia and Moldova embodied the worst possible characteristics an interventionary action 
could have.     
The preceding analysis delineates portions of Russia’s involvement in Georgia and 
Moldova that could be considered both forceful intervention and peacekeeping.  The mixture 
of characteristics leaves one wondering how to classify Russian activities in these two 
conflicts.  In his analysis of the conflicts, Dov Lynch “maintains that the Russian government 
has pursued a strategy of armed suasion… [which] consists of the limited use of force and 
other tools of pressure…against a target state…in order to influence the [target’s] 
actions/perceptions…in a direction desired by the external state…”73 Lynch’s focus on 
Russia’s actions for the purpose of influencing Georgia and Moldova’s policies is necessary 
to understand why the Russian government responded to these conflicts the way it did.  
Lynch’s explanation, however, is not sufficient to complete comprehension of Russia’s 
involvement.  
 The Russian government offered its help to the Georgian and Moldovan governments 
only after these governments conceded to several of Russia’s key foreign policy goals: 
Georgia joined the CIS and Moldova permitted Russian troops to be deployed on Moldovan 
soil.  By agreeing to Russia’s demands, the Georgian and Moldovan governments effectively 
provided Russia with a greater foothold in each country’s internal politics, which was a 
critical aspect in Russia retaining influence in the former Soviet sphere.  Before these 
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concessions, however, Russia was very involved in supporting the Transdniestrians and 
Abkhazians for several reasons that, as will be outlined later, had very little to do with getting 
Georgia and Moldova to capitulate Russian demands.  These additional reasons suggest that 
there is a more apt definition for Russia’s involvement than pure military intervention, 
traditional peacekeeping and even Lynch’s “strategy of armed suasion.” 
Given Russia’s status, at the time, of being the main third party in both clashes; its 
lack of neutrality throughout its involvement; Ministry of Defense support for an armed 
“peacekeeping” force that engaged members of the warring parties; and clear political 
motivations that stretched from domestic to the former Soviet states to other countries’ 
perceptions of Russia and its power, Russia’s involvement in the conflicts in Abkhazia and 
Transdniestria defies classification.  The inability to categorize Russia’s activities is 
important because attempting to classify either operation as either peacekeeping or forceful 
intervention results in misleading assumptions about Russia’s intent.  In addition, if the way 
Russia executed its policies in Abkhazia and Transdniestria could be pigeonholed into an 
existing political science theory, this discussion would be reduced to studying Russia’s 
operations, their actions and effectiveness, in relation to past peacekeeping missions.   
Russia did, indeed, intervene in the conflicts in Abkhazia and Transdniestria—this 
cannot be argued.  Any third party interjecting itself into the middle of a clash between two 
groups of people would be intervening, though, regardless of that third party’s intent.  
Russia’s intervention was different from traditional military intervention because the Russian 
government was determined that its involvement in Georgia and Moldova was 
“peacekeeping.”  Its desire to interject a “peacekeeping” force into these two conflicts meant 
that the Russian government attempted at several points to undo the harm inflicted on itself 
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by outwardly supporting the separatists in the beginning.  In a speech to Georgian and 
Abkhaz authorities on 28 August 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin emphasized that  
Russia does not support separatist and warring appeals, no matter 
where they have originated from.  Our country will undertake every 
necessary action to put a stop to the infiltration of Georgian territory by 
armed detachments…At the same time, we are convinced of the necessity of 
immediate conclusion of fighting and the cessation of all war-like actions [in 
order to] secure the human rights…of the Abkhaz and other people of 
Georgia.74 
These remarks paint the Russian government as the ultimate peacekeeping force, standing up 
for national sovereignty and protecting every individual’s rights to safety and security.  Some 
people might argue that Yeltsin merely said these things to win support for Russian military 
activities, and these people would not be wholly wrong.  Yet the fact remains that after the 
Russian government announced the formation of peacekeeping forces in Georgia and 
Moldova, it initiated cease-fires in both countries that were subsequently broken by the 
Transdniestrians and Abkhazians, not by Russian, Georgian, or Moldovan forces.  Russian 
“peacekeeping” forces were nowhere near as impartial as they should have been to truly be 
considered peacekeeping troops, and, as Dov Lynch points out, these forces “froze the 
conflicts at the point where Russia’s wider security concerns had been secured (Georgia), or 
at least at that point that was most advantageous to Russia’s interests (Moldova).”75 
However, Russian troops in these regions appeared to at least attempt to stop the fighting, 
even when the rest of the international community had little to do with either situation.76 
These points are not made to defend Russia’s activities, but rather to underscore the difficulty 
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of categorizing Russia’s involvement in Georgia and Moldova.  In the end, the Russian 
government contributed to the conflicts and to solving them for domestic and foreign policy 
reasons. 
 Russian intervention in the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova involved forceful 
military actions and concentrated peacekeeping efforts.  Forceful military actions attempted 
to reinforce Russia’s interests and influence in the former Soviet sphere by strengthening the 
ties between Russia, the Transdniestrians and the Abkhaz.  Support for the separatists also 
put pressure on the Georgian and Moldovan governments, which finally capitulated to certain 
demands that gave Russia a stronger foothold in each country.  At this point Russia changed 
tactics and instigated peacekeeping operations.  Through peacekeeping the Russian 
government could extend greater support to Georgia and Moldova, with which it wanted to 
strengthen ties.  At the same time, Russia could attempt to mitigate some of the harmful 
effects its earlier actions in these conflicts had on its ability to continue to influence each 
situation.   
 
Chapter 5: Russia’s Method: Rationale, Policies, and Practices for Peacekeeping 
Missions in Georgia and Moldova 
 
Preceding sections of this thesis outline historical factors leading to the outbreak of 
fighting in Abkhazia and Transdniestria; Russia’s direct role in these conflicts and how this 
role changed as Russia’s foreign policy goals were met or morphed; and a look at both 
intervention theory and peacekeeping theory, with the intent of categorizing Russia’s actions 
as forceful intervention, peacekeeping, or something in between.  With such background 
information established, this section of the thesis addresses several important questions.  
How have Russia’s actions precluded, replaced, or accompanied the international 
community’s response to these conflicts?  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, what 
rationale has the Russia government provided for its actions in these two conflicts?  
Rationale will be provided for Russia’s early activities in each conflict, when the Russian 
government supported the separatists, and for Russia’s actions after it instituted 
“peacekeeping” forces in Georgia and Moldova.  
 
Why, Exactly?  Russia’s Rationale, Part 1 
 Reiterating the disarray into which Russia’s identity as a state and nation was thrown 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union is hardly necessary.  While Russia found itself the 
main benefactor of the U.S.S.R.’s institutions and infrastructure, the Russian government and 
population received no assistance in deciding how, exactly, to restructure or, more 
appropriately, to recreate its identity and standing in the world community.  Russia went 
from being at the center of a huge empire to a country that was struggling to define itself, and 
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this struggle affected the Russian government’s activities at every level.  Margot Light 
comments that “[a]ttempts to redefine Russia’s identity [following the end of the Soviet 
Union] affected the coherence of foreign policy...”77 She continues that “[m]ost Russians 
found it difficult to accept that some areas of the USSR were no longer part of Russia.  It was 
not just…nostalgia for past greatness… The loss of empire led to confusion about Russia’s 
role in the world.”78 
The Russian government, then, was left with the monumental task of completely 
recalibrating its internal politics in addition to its foreign policy.  As Light’s comments 
demonstrate, this task was made more complicated by the fact that the Russian government 
and its citizens were being forced to answer a more basic question about Russia’s identity 
and its status since it was no longer one of the world’s superpowers. 
 As the Kremlin worked to redefine its policies in the early 1990s, a few overarching 
themes quickly became apparent.  First, the Russian government realized that its “hands-off” 
policy towards other former Soviet republics was ineffective if Russia wanted to gain/retain 
“great power” status in the international community.79 The desire to be the foreign presence 
in these former republics intensified as Russia realized that if it did not get involved, some 
other country or international organization would.  The last thing the Russian government 
wanted was to lose even more control over its near abroad, which had traditionally been its 
power base in interactions with Europe and the United States.80 
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 Russia’s expanding concern for its sphere of influence as rationale for its involvement 
in Abkhazia and Transdniestria is reminiscent of Dmitri Trenin’s comment, quoted earlier, 
about “imperial restoration.”  It seems that rather than trying to restore its empire physically, 
what the Russian government really wanted was the power, prestige, and resources that 
accompanied its status as the center of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.  S. Neil 
MacFarlane highlights what Russia stood to gain through increased influence in the former 
Soviet Union when he references “the fate of the Russian Diaspora, the lack of developed 
defenses among the borders of the Russian Federation…concern over Islam, and discomfort 
with the spill-over effects of instability in other regions.”81 
The determination to protect Russians everywhere went beyond the fear, for example, 
that conflicts flaring up in countries bordering on Russia could spread to Russia itself.  As 
was mentioned in the section on the conflict in Moldova, the Soviet Union’s collapse left 
large groups of troops, weapons, and ammunition scattered throughout the ex-Soviet 
republics.  Russia, as the beneficiary of the Soviet military institution, knew that if it did not 
act fast to defend its newly acquired military installations, its military’s firepower and troop 
numbers would be greatly diminished as independent republics laid claim to Soviet military 
arsenals.82 Not wanting to lose what had been one of the Soviet Union’s most advanced and 
well-developed attributes, the Russian government moved to protect its interests.  In this 
case, that meant getting involved in conflicts in former Soviet republics.      
 It is also important to note that, when it decided to get involved in Abkhazia and 
Moldova, the Russian government itself was internally divided.  Schisms formed between the 
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old guard, hard-line Communists who wanted to return to the Soviet system; the reformists 
who wanted Russia to become democratic and integrated in the international community; and 
the rest of the politicians, who fell somewhere in the middle.  As it became clear that Russia 
needed to protect investments in former Soviet Republics, however, members of the Russian 
government that disagreed on everything else rallied around the conviction that these 
interests had to be protected.83 
Internal divisions were not the only challenge to developing Russia’s policy towards 
the former Soviet republics, however.  The collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent 
upheaval of its structures meant that Russia’s domestic political situation needed to be 
redeveloped.  This redevelopment was touted as the chance for Russia to emerge as a fully 
democratic state.  It encountered problems, however, when it became apparent that rather 
than forming a government based on effective laws, divisions within the Russian government 
were basing decisions on whether or not they would curry favor with President Boris Yeltsin.   
 Yeltsin’s power and popularity were cemented after his prominent role in ending the 
August 1991 coup attempt.  “Yeltsin emerged from the [August 1991] putsch with the status 
of a demigod…he was widely regarded in his own society as a doer of extraordinary deeds, a 
holder of distinctive powers, and a liberator from a widely despised…way of life,” writes M. 
Steven Fish.84 Unfortunately, however, the strengthening of Yeltsin’s personal popularity 
did not result in better defined political powers.  In fact, Fish notes that while Russia in the 
early 1990s could be considered a democracy because it held elections on a regular basis, the 
formation of government institutions based on Yeltsin’s popularity created a case of 
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superpresidentialism that harmed Russia more than it helped.  Specifically, Fish writes that 
“[s]uperpresidentialism… contributed to the legitimacy crisis in Russia by identifying the 
regime with a single individual in the popular imagination…”85 “Identifying the regime” 
with a personality like Yeltsin became even more harmful for the government’s legitimacy 
both domestically and internationally as Yeltsin’s less positive character traits emerged. 
 Domestic politics in Russia were detrimentally influenced, then, by the fact that 
Yeltsin’s personality was central to the government’s functioning.  The focus on Yeltsin’s 
personality manifested itself in a system of government in which power was focused almost 
exclusively in the executive branch, which meant that there were few checks on Yeltsin’s 
initiatives.86 In what George W. Breslauer describes as a personalistic system, “the key to 
political longevity and influence was to capture the attention and ear of the patriarch 
[Yeltsin].87 Such competition led government officials to focus on competing for Yeltsin’s 
esteem rather than formulating sound policies that would help Russia develop as a 
democratic society.  Yeltsin favored this self-aggrandizing approach to politics, choosing “to 
manipulate diversity in ways that played factions off against each other and thereby 
maintained or enhanced his image as the ‘ultimate arbiter.”88 
Yeltsin’s management techniques further endangered Russia’s legitimacy and ability 
to function effectively.  Such practices, including the creation of parallel government 
agencies; constant hiring and firing of government employees, and regular restructuring of 
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existing organizations left the government in a constant state of flux.89 President Yeltsin’s 
abuse of his personal power and popularity, then, harmed Russia’s fledgling government as 
officials were so focused on competing with each other to gain the President’s favor and 
protect their jobs that they did not focus on creating sound domestic or foreign policy. 
Competition for Yeltsin’s favor escalated to the point that it caused radical changes in 
Russia’s foreign policy.  Whereas directly after the Soviet Union collapsed the Russian 
government was focused on cementing its ties with the West, the “struggle for political 
power in Moscow and the politicization of foreign policy” pushed Russian foreign policy to 
converge on the “near abroad” instead.90 This competition, combined with the fact that 
throughout his presidency Yeltsin relied heavily on the military’s backing, meant that 
Russian policies towards the CIS were largely formulated by the Ministry of Defense (MoD) 
rather than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA).91 The MoD’s control over such Russia’s 
CIS policies explains why many of these policies were based on hard, military based power, 
rather than soft, diplomatic power sources.   
Internal disputes over control of Russia’s “near abroad” policy spread even further 
than the MoD and MFA.  Russian Border Service and the CIS High Command joined the 
fray, and these four bodies disagreed on everything from general policy to, more specifically, 
commencing peacekeeping operations in the near abroad.  “Differences between these 
institutions…ranged from viewing ‘peacekeeping’ as a tool of coercive diplomacy to 
interpreting it as a form of combat activity at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict,” says 
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Dov Lynch.92 The inability of different divisions of the Russian government to agree, not 
just on policy options, but on how different practices should be carried out, shows the degree 
to which Russia’s domestic political squabbles affected its ability to enact concrete, 
legitimate foreign policy.  The competition between government institutions, uncertainty 
about job security, and the desire to garner Yeltsin’s favor, in combination with Yeltsin’s 
own dependence on the military’s support undoubtedly influenced Russia’s policy towards 
former Soviet republics in the early 1990s.   
A second piece of rationale for Russia’s involvement in the former Soviet Republics 
was Russia’s conviction that it knew more about the area, and was therefore more capable of 
providing assistance where and when it was needed.93 Russian Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev, in an April 1992 television interview said as much when he noted that “[w]e 
understand the psychology, we have all come from one ‘zone’ so to speak and so we 
understand each other very well.  Nobody understands these post-Soviet problems as well as 
the Soviet people themselves.”94 This argument relates to Russia’s constant and continuous 
claims that the former Soviet space did then—and to this day—belong in Russia’s sphere of 
influence.  Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept spoke, in the early 1990s, of Russia’s 
responsibility to develop positive relations among the newly independent states, as well as its 
role as “the guarantor of the stability of these relations.”95 
Pavel Baev puts forward another hypothesis to explain Russian involvement in these 
conflicts.  He contends that the various conflicts in the Balkans “allow[ed] Russia to claim 
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legitimacy for its own intervention: first, no one else was able or willing to shoulder the 
burden,”96 just as various members of the international community shied away from stepping 
forward to address the burgeoning crisis in Yugoslavia.  “[S]econd,” Baev continues,  
Russia [insisted that it] was not violating any international norms.  
Supporting secessions made the second argument weak, but Russia…could 
point to the precedents created by UN peacekeeping operations in Croatia, 
where the ‘blue helmets’ were securing Serbian control of Krajina, as well as 
in Bosnia, where partitions as a principle have been accepted.97 
In short, Russia felt justified in using the international community’s response to the conflicts 
in the former Yugoslavia as validation for Russian decisions to respond to fighting in 
Abkhazia and Transdniestria.  If members of the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE 
purportedly followed the “rules” of peacekeeping in their activities in Yugoslavia and had 
such difficulty getting things accomplished, what right did these same organizations and 
countries have to balk at Russia’s less conventional involvement in Georgia and Moldova? 
 Thirdly, members of the recently formed Russian government wanted to live up to the 
expectations of governments from the developed democratic world.  These governments 
were carefully watching Russia and promising a great deal of assistance—monetary and 
otherwise—in an effort to help Russia become a bastion of democracy in the former 
Communist sphere.  Gennady Burbulis, a high-ranking official in Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin’s cabinet, underlined Russia’s desire to reform its image in the near and far abroad 
when, in comments made in early 1992, he said that “Russia had ‘to prove to the world…and 
ourselves that we are acquiring fundamentally new values and are able to…stop intimidating 
the world community with the Great Russian Superpower.’”  He joined with then Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev in insisting that the Russian government needed to “expunge 
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‘imperial thinking’” from its policies.  Kozyrev went on to insist that although Russia had 
“geostrategic interests in the former Soviet Union, Russian relations with these states had to 
be established on the basis of equality and good will.”98 
Both Burbulis and Kozyrev acknowledged that Russia was using its size, power, and 
policies to evoke concessions from its neighbors; at the same time, however, both 
government officials seemed to recognize that if they wanted to gain real respect in the world 
community, they had to stop pushing other countries around simply because they could.  
While such concessions could be mere political posturing, comments such as those quoted 
above give some insight into reasons that the Russian government decided to change course 
in the middle of its operations in Georgia and Moldova.  By admitting to its use of 
intimidation and declaring a desire to establish relations based on “equality and good will,” 
the Russian government was justifying its endeavors in former Soviet Republics as positive 
and solution-oriented.   
 The final and perhaps most intuitive rationale for scholars familiar with many of 
Russia’s post-Soviet foreign policy decisions was Russia’s desire to maintain some 
semblance of the power that it had enjoyed as a central component of the Soviet Union.  This 
explanation hints at the other side of the “hegemony” explanation that was presented earlier.  
It is true that Russia’s desire to protect its citizens and other Russophones led Russia to take a 
decisive role in the conflicts in Abkhazia and Transdniestria.  At the same time, however, one 
of the biggest problems facing Russia was the loss of its Superpower status.  Elaine M. 
Holobof explains the connection between this loss of status and Russia’s actions in the near 
abroad when she writes that “…one of the driving forces [behind Russia’s military 
intervention was] the need to maintain the belief that Russia is still a great power, despite the 
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failure of ideology, the loss of empire, humiliating economic conditions, and frequently 
absurd domestic policies.”99 Indeed, Russia’s willingness to take on the conflicts in 
Abkhazia and Georgia mirrored a desire that remains prevalent to this day on all levels of 
Russian society: the desire to be taken seriously, and to be shown the respect accorded a 
great world power—a respect that the government and people feel they never should have 
lost.   
All of the above rationales are intended to be general, rather than reasons specifically 
tailored towards the conflicts in either Abkhazia or Transdniestria.  In researching and 
subsequently analyzing the reasons provided, a couple of common denominators stand out.  
The first is that in its involvement in the former Soviet republics, Russia expressed a great 
desire to protect. The Russian government ensconced itself in these countries and the 
conflicts that sprang up because it had an innate desire to protect its people, borders, and the 
institutions Russia inherited from the Soviet Union.  The second commonality was the 
Russian government’s desire to promote. As Russia strove to recreate itself in the early 
1990s, involvement in the near abroad enabled Russia to promote itself as a country that was 
still capable of functioning as a regional hegemon; as a power that deserved attention and 
respect from the rest of the world for its ability to bring conflicting parties together; and as a 
government that, despite its new formation and villainized past (for the West), was able to act 
decisively and effectively when it saw the need to do so.   
Russia’s desire to protect and promote its interests in the early 1990s may sound like 
rhetoric, and, in many cases, the government was likely espousing policies to assuage 
political fallout from some of its actions.  The point, however, is not to analyze how well the 
Russian government’s actions matched its statements.  The focus of this thesis is to look at 
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why Russia thought it was justified in acting and reacting to conflicts in Abkhazia and 
Moldova in a particular way.  For this reason, it is most important to consider the Russian 
government’s explanations, rather than how it actually implemented (or failed to implement, 
in some cases) the policies that it championed. 
 
Why, Exactly?  Russia’s Rationale, Part 2 
Everything mentioned in the section on Russia’s general rationale for involvement in 
the former Soviet bloc applies to the situations in Abkhazia and Transdniestria.  Russia also 
had specific justifications for its activities in both Georgia and Moldova.  The purpose of this 
section is to document these specific reasons, and in doing so, attempt to understand the 
Russian government’s justifications for its actions in the early 1990s.   
 
Georgia 
 One of the Russian government’s explanations for its continued presence in ex-Soviet 
countries was to protect Russia and Russian interests.  When Abkhazia declared its 
independence from Georgia, the Russian government realized that any fighting in this region 
could endanger the Russian Federation for a number of reasons.  Catherine Dale explains 
how Georgia, as part of the Caucasus region  
has long served as a critical buffer zone against potential threats from 
Iran or Turkey.  Any instability leaves a stretch of Russia’s underbelly 
exposed.  War in Georgia in particular cuts off the flow of transportation and 
resources to Armenia, with which Russia has also tried to maintain 
particularly close ties…Most importantly, conflict in the Transcaucasus not 
only brings profound instability right to Russia’s back door, but also carries 
the danger that fighting will spill over into the Russian Federation.100 
100 Dale, 124. 
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Fighting between Georgian and Abkhaz troops, then, presented another problem for the 
Russian government, which was already handling a bevy of political, social, and economic 
problems when the conflict erupted.  The Russian government’s decision to play an active 
role in the conflict in Abkhazia might seem counterintuitive to outsiders; after all, Russia had 
plenty to manage without entering a war in a foreign country.  On the other hand, as Ms. 
Dale’s quote highlights, instability in Georgia could lead to greater instability in the 
Caucasus region as a whole.  An unstable Georgia or other Caucasus country could, in turn, 
endanger the Russian Federation.  It made more sense for Russia to wade into the Abkhaz-
Georgian clash than face the unknown consequences of an unstable, volatile border.   
If Russia wanted stability, why did it begin its foray into Georgian politics by 
supporting Abkhaz separatists—a move that would more likely contribute to destabilization?  
One explanation could involve Russia’s historically close ties to Abkhazia.  Another 
possibility, though, is that Russia thought that by assisting the separatists, it could secure a 
faster victory—victory that would allow both the Georgians and the Abkhaz to establish their 
newly formed territories more quickly than would a long, drawn-out military campaign.   
 If this was Russia’s goal, however, it soon backfired.  The Abkhaz were either so 
strengthened by Russia’s military assistance, or the Georgians were so weakened by the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and flight of military goods and capital, that as fighting 
continued, Georgia teetered on the brink of destruction.101 It was at this point, that the 
Georgian government agreed to join the CIS in return for the cessation of Russia’s assistance 
to the Abkhaz.  Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s concessions to Russian demands 
lead to another conclusion: the possibility that, if the Russians applied the right amount of 
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pressure on the Georgians, they could achieve particular foreign policy goals.102 Such goals 
insured Russia’s role as a (if not the) major power in the region, or at least guaranteed Russia 
an influential place in Georgian politics.  Official Russian Government statements do not 
admit to using military force to induce a specific response from the Georgian government.  
Instead, speeches like the one Yeltsin delivered to a group of citizens from the North 
Caucasus suggest just the opposite.  Yeltsin reaffirmed Russia’s devotion to a unified 
Georgia in which every citizen is accorded the “all around security of human rights and the 
harmonious combination of interests of all the Georgian people.”103 This speech capitalized 
on positive public diplomacy—the kind that would build support for Russia’s activities in 
Georgia. 
 Russia’s desire to retain its influence in the region made Georgia’s geographic 
position an even more important explanation for Russian involvement.  First, Georgia shares 
a border with Chechnya, a separatist region with which Russia has struggled, most recently, 
since about the time fighting broke out between the Abkhaz and Georgians.104 Maintaining a 
physical presence and political influence in Georgia could provide Russia a foothold in an 
area that might otherwise prove increasingly unstable and unfriendly towards Russia.  The 
Russian government’s desire to retain Georgia as an ally, or at the very least not to push 
Georgia away helps to explain the Russian government’s about-face in its approach to the 
conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia.  After supporting the separatists’ cause for several 
months in 1992, the Russian Ministries of Foreign Affairs Defense “rejected the creation of 
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an independent Abkhazia, which might encourage separation in [other states] in the North 
Caucasus.”105 The Russian government saw that its support for Abkhaz independence 
actually threatened the stability of the Caucasus region by unintentionally encouraging other 
separatist groups to fight for independence.  Russia also realized that if one region of Georgia 
succeeded in securing independence, other regions of other countries—including parts of 
Russia—might follow suit.  This led the Russian government to throw its support behind a 
“peacekeeping” mission in Georgia, in the hopes that a solution could be found to preserve 
Georgia as a unified, peaceful Russian ally.   
Georgia’s other strategically important characteristic is its Black Sea ports.106 These 
ports provide Russia’s oil industry with access to crucial export markets.  The loss of these 
ports would seriously damage Russia’s economy.  In addition to stability in the region and 
security for Russians and Russophones, then, ensuring continued access to Georgia by 
instigating a “peacekeeping” mission during the Abkhaz/Georgian conflict made economic 
sense for Russia as well.   
Another reason, that might provide the most acceptable/conventional explanation for 
Russia’s initial military response was the attack on Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia as 
the conflict was breaking out.  There is no conclusive proof implicating Georgian troops in 
these attacks.  The fact that a Russian helicopter was destroyed by a “missile fired from 
Georgian controlled territory” in December 1992, and that shortly thereafter both an attack 
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on a Russian helicopter and an invasion of a Russian Supply Base in Tbilisi transpired, 
however, lead directly to Russian assistance for the Abkhaz. 107 
In sum, Russia’s rationale for getting involved in the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict was 
based on several factors.  From a geographically strategic standpoint, Georgia was (and 
remains) an important “buffer zone” between Russia and some of its volatile mid-Eastern 
neighbors.  In addition, Georgia’s position in the North Caucasus—an area that has proven 
troublesome for post-Soviet Russia—makes Russia’s presence in Georgia, as well as 
Georgia’s stability, more important.  Georgia also provides Russia with crucial access to 
Black Sea ports.  On the political strategy side, Russia’s active response to the conflict in 
Georgia extracted important political concessions from the Georgian government.  It also 
provided an arena for Russia to continue asserting its influence in the former Soviet Union.  
Finally, Russian troops were directly attacked in a presumably unprovoked act of aggression 
while they remained stationed in Georgia in late 1992.   
 
Moldova 
The logic behind Russia’s active participation in the Transdniestria/Moldova conflict 
shares a few similarities with those given for Abkhazia/Georgia: that of geographically 
strategic importance and increased influence in the former Soviet Union.  Georgia’s strategic 
geographic significance provides Russia with a buffer zone between it and other more 
volatile areas and connections to Black Sea ports.  Moldova, on the other hand, with its 
proximity to Western Europe, provides Russia a buffer zone between itself and NATO 
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member states.108 Many former Soviet republics expressed interest in joining NATO shortly 
after they gained independence, which caused concern in Moscow.  Although NATO’s 
founding purpose was basically eradicated by the collapse of communism in Europe, Russia 
remained worried about NATO’s encroachment on countries that should remain part of 
Russia’s sphere of influence.  Just as Georgia could provide Russia a stable ally in the North 
Caucasus, then, so too did Russia want Moldova to remain a stable supporter of Russia in an 
area increasingly influenced by Europe and the United States. 
Russia’s initial support for Abkhaz separatists persuaded Georgian President Eduard 
Shevardnadze to join the CIS; in the same way, Russia’s backing the Transdniestrians pushed 
Moldovan President Snegur to eventually accept Russia’s help in resolving the conflict—
including allowing a semi-permanent contingent of Russian troops to be based in Moldova.  
Russia’s actions in Transdniestria, especially early on in the conflict cemented Russia’s 
influence in Moldova for the foreseeable future.   
The other main explanation stems from Russia’s desire to protect native Russians and 
other Russophones living in Transdniestria.  As mentioned previously, as the U.S.S.R. was 
disintegrating there was a strong movement within Moldova to strengthen ties with Romania.  
Besides lessening, or obliterating altogether, Russian influence in Moldova, the Russian 
government was also very concerned about the fate of “ethnic Russians and other Slav 
secessionists who make up more than two-thirds of the population of [Transdniestria].”109 
Russia saw closer ties between Moldova and Romania as a threat to this population—a threat 
that required direct intercession on its part.   
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Russia’s active defense of the Transdniestrians, which led to increasing involvement 
in Transdniestria/Moldova as a whole, was furthered by the Moldovan government’s actions.  
While this conflict crystallized in 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declared Russia’s 
desire to remain uninvolved.  However, as Andrew Bennett notes, “[w]ithin a few days, 
seemingly in response to Yeltsin’s non-interventionist stance, Moldovan forces went on the 
offensive and besieged Bendery [in Transdniestria].”110 Bennett goes on to quote Alexander 
Pikayev, a Russian scholar at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace’s Moscow 
Center: “for the first time since World War II, weapons were used against a Russian speaking 
population…Russia’s response was swift and dramatic…in part because the date of the 
Moldovan offensive marked the anniversary of Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 
1941.”111 While Moldovan troops did not attack Russian troops, as allegedly happened 
between Georgian and Russian troops in Georgia, Moldova’s aggressive action in the face of 
Russia’s attempts at neutrality (or at least disengagement) were interpreted by the Russians 
as a provocation that required a direct response. 
Russia’s desire to protect Russophones from what it considered contentious actions 
by the Moldovan government provided Russia more validation for its activities in 
Transdniestria: humanitarian assistance.  In an April 1992 interview on Russian television, 
Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi explained that “While following the cause of non-
interference in the affairs of another state, Russia must at the same time defend Russian and 
other citizens.”112 Initial Russian justification, therefore, centered on Russian claims of the 
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necessity to provide humanitarian assistance and protection to people under its national 
umbrella.   
The position of the Russian military vis-à-vis this conflict supported the 
government’s contentions that it was involved to protect people.  In an interview in the 
Russian newspaper Krasnaia Zvezda, Russian Lt. Colonel S. Popov asserted that “The 
[Russian] Army is not fighting, but protecting itself and its people.”  He continued by voicing 
what he considered to be the government’s orders for the mission in Transdniestria/Moldova: 
“protect the Russia people, but don’t get mixed up in the conflict; if they shoot at you—
answer, but don’t call [gunfire] upon yourselves.”113 These remarks could be solely for 
political consumption; on the other hand, they also reflect the deeply-ingrained belief that 
Russia had a duty to protect Transdniestrians, and that in this case doing so entailed military 
involvement. 
When it became clear that retaining Moldova’s support would be more beneficial than 
just protecting Russophones in Transdniestria on a political and strategic level, Russia’s 
emphasis shifted to “peacekeeping” activities.  Its role as “peacekeeper” in the conflict 
ensured Russia continued access to Moldova as a geographic stronghold against the incursion 
of NATO, as well as another post-Soviet arena in which Russia could continue to wield its 
influence.   
Russia’s rationale for its involvement in the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova was 
not too different, overall, from its general explanation for its foreign policy in former Soviet 
states in general.  Russia wanted to guarantee a continued degree of influence in both 
Georgia and Moldova; it wanted to protect itself from volatile states and the uncertainty of 
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changing alliances that surrounded Russian territory; and, especially in the case of Moldova, 
Russia felt an intrinsic need to protect ethnic Russians and other Russophones living abroad.  
There may be other reasons that Russia felt justified in engaging in these two conflicts.  This 
section has presented the most prominent explanations for Russia’s foray—first as a biased 
party, and then as a self-declared “peacekeeping” force—into what could be considered 
solely internal conflicts. 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
While the bulk of Russian military action took place in the early 1990s, Russian 
troops are still stationed in both Moldova and Georgia—much to the consternation of 
Moldova’s and Georgia’s governments.  Both countries have changed governments at least 
once since fighting erupted in the two countries, and the close ties that these new 
governments have developed with countries other than Russia have strained relations with 
Moscow.  As a result, the Russian government’s influence in each of these former Soviet 
republics has been greatly reduced.  Georgia and Moldova are also members of GUUAM 
(along with Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan), a group formed in 1996 “as a political, 
economic and strategic alliance designed to strengthen the independence and sovereignty of 
these former Soviet Union Republics.”114 This increased strength in GUUAM’s 
“independence and sovereignty” translates into a challenge to Russia’s domination, both in 
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the former Soviet Union as a whole.115 
The Russian government is also under increasing pressure from Moldova, Georgia, 
and much of the international community to withdraw Russian troops from Moldova and 
Georgia.  The Russian government pledged to do this at the 1999 OSCE meeting in Turkey, 
but as of today has yet to initiate the withdrawal. 116 The first part of this chapter will take a 
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brief look at changes that have occurred in the relationships between the Russian, Georgian 
and Moldovan governments, as well as the effect these changes have had on Russia’s 
involvement in the conflict in each country.  This section will provide a less than 
comprehensive account of the problems that plague the association between Russia and each 
of these countries.  The examples provided, though, should contribute to a basic 
understanding of the increasing challenges Russia faces in implementing its foreign policy in 
Georgia and Moldova.   
 
Georgia 
 When Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze relinquished his position in the wake 
of the peaceful “Rose Revolution” in 2003, he also waived much of the Russia’s ability to 
influence Georgian politics.  Shevardnadze, who was a politician in the Soviet Union’s 
Communist government as well, was replaced through democratic elections by Mikhail 
Saakashvili in 2004.  The onset of Saakashvili’s government instigated greater efforts to 
abandon Georgia’s Soviet ties and forge stronger connections to the West—especially with 
the United States.  This, obviously, has not made Russia very happy, and relations between 
Georgia and Russia have steadily deteriorated.  
 The relationship between the Russian and Georgian governments has been plagued by 
the continued presence of Russian troops in Georgia; the large number of Georgian refugees 
who were displaced by the conflict in Abkhazia and have yet to return to their homes; and 
Russia’s allegations that Georgia has provided Chechen terrorists refuge in its Pankisi Gorge 
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region.117 These grievances constitute a large part of the problem in relations between the 
Georgian and Russian governments, as other problems that arise often refer to the above 
issues.  A recent situation provides a good example.  In January 2006, several natural gas 
pipelines in Georgia exploded—coincidentally, during one of the coldest Georgian winters in 
recent memory.  The official explanation wavers between accident and sabotage, but 
Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili has publicly accused Russia of purposely causing the 
explosions in an attempt to increase its influence on Georgia’s energy industry.118 Russia 
denied this allegation, which engendered an angrier response, in which Saakashvili promised 
to demand that Russian peacekeeping troops “leave the country immediately…or…the 
Russian forces will formally become occupation forces.”119 
President Saakashvili’s comments might simply be a show of strength for a 
population that is cold and tired of energy dependence on its resource-rich northern neighbor.  
However, his promise to “demand” that Russian troops leave, when accompanied by the 
threat of calling Russian troops an “occupation” force demonstrates how far apart the two 
governments have grown from one another.  Russia may have induced Georgian 
acquiescence to Russian military presence and closer ties as co-members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent states in the 1990s.  However, Georgia’s new, westward-
leaning government wants to emerge from Russia’s shadow and be its own entity, separate 
from its Soviet history and its more recent ties to the Russian Federation.   
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Moldova 
Moldova’s government has also changed since conflict erupted.  In 2001 Communist 
Party candidate Vladimir Voronin was elected Moldova’s President “on a pro-Russian, anti-
European programme” and was subsequently re-elected in 2005 “on a pro-EU, anti Russian 
platform.”120 That the same candidate was elected twice with diametrically opposed foreign 
policy campaigns gives some indication of the shaky state of relations between Moldova and 
Russia.   
The rocky state of its relationship has encouraged the Russian government to resolve 
the continuing strife between Transdniestria and Moldova.  The Kozak Memorandum, which 
Russia issued in 2003, outlined a detailed plan that, when fully implemented in 2020, would 
result in the “neutral, demilitarized state” of Moldova.121 Russia negotiated this 
memorandum in secret so that when it was released the OSCE, which has been working 
towards its own settlement plan, was completely surprised.  Even more surprising was the 
second “secret” Kozak Memorandum, released a few days after the original.  This “secret” 
agreement promised President Smirnov that a sizeable contingent of Russian troops would 
remain in Transdniestria for the next two decades.  This pledge went directly against Russia’s 
1999 agreement to remove all of its troops from Moldova by December 2002, yet Moldovan 
President Vladimir Voronin approved this version of the Kozak memorandum anyway.122 
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Voronin’s support for Russia’s Kozak Memorandum was short-lived, however.  
Pressure from the OSCE, United States, and Moldovan citizens convinced Voronin, at the 
last minute, to reject Russia’s plans.123 Voronin’s rebuff scarred the relationship between 
Moldova and Russia; it also indicated that organizations like the OSCE and some Western 
governments were usurping Russia’s influential position in Moldova.   
The OSCE has been monitoring the situation in Moldova for more than a decade and 
remains one of the most consistent and persistent third parties demanding the withdrawal of 
Russian troops.  The OSCE has been both a major source of information about Russia’s lack 
of withdrawal activity, and one of the forces pushing for this troop withdrawal to take place.  
In a September 2001 meeting with US government representatives in Washington DC, 
Ambassador William Hill, head of the OSCE mission to Moldova, made comments about the 
deteriorating condition of Russia’s mission in Moldova and reasons that Russian troops are 
still there.  According to Ambassador Hill, problems with Russia’s troop presence and the 
Russian government extend beyond Russian-Moldovan government tension to the 
Transdniestrian government as well.  Despite this apparent friction, however, the 
Transdniestrian authorities are not in any hurry to see Russian troops leave.  While in 
Washington, Ambassador Hill remarked that  
“…the basic aim of [Transdniestrian] resistance is to keep a Russian presence 
[in Transdniestria]…they know the Russians won’t leave…arms unattended.  
Therefore, if [Transdniestrian troops] can keep the arms…they’ll keep the Russians, 
and that serves as a de facto shield against possible attacks from the outside…”124 
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While the Transdniestrian and Russian governments may be at odds, then, the 
Transdniestrian Government realizes that Russian troops provide Transdniestria with more 
substantial protection than it could provide for itself.   
Ambassador Hill also made a comment that reveals that some Russians still cling to 
their government’s historical right to be involved in this conflict.  Ambassador Hill refers to 
Russian nationalists “who remember that…the city of Tiraspol was founded…in the time of 
Catherine the Great…[and so]…consider that they should not have to leave.”125 The 
combination of the Transdniestrian government’s faith in Russian troops’ protection and the 
historical ties cast yet another shadow over Russia’s insistence that its involvement in the 
conflict between Transdniestria/Moldova has been of a “peacekeeping” nature. 
Most recently, the December 2005 OSCE meeting failed to produce its customary 
final document after Russia refused to agree to a statement stating that “[t]he foreign 
ministers of the OSCE note the lack of movement in 2005 on the withdrawal of Russian 
forces from Moldova…[and] reaffirmed their shared determination to promote the fulfillment 
of that commitment as soon as possible.”126 The OSCE foreign ministers’ desire to include 
this point, as well as the Russian government’s refusal to accept the text because its inclusion 
shows that, regardless of previous pledges to do so, getting the Russian government to 
actually remove its troops from Transdniestria/Moldova will be a big task.        
The OSCE is not the only outside party pushing for Russian troop withdrawals from 
Transdniestria/Moldova.  Since Victor Yushchenko came to power in Ukraine early last year, 
he has made great efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Moldova.  In fact, in 
April 2005 the Ukrainian government unveiled a “settlement proposal” for Moldova, since 
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referred to as the “Yushchenko Plan.”  The “Yushchenko Plan” has been approved by many 
of the parties involved in both the conflict and its resolution—although this approval comes, 
according to the Economist Intelligence Unit, largely as a result of the agreement’s 
“intentional vagueness.”  The agreement “centered on the unobjectionable notion of 
encouraging democratization in Transdniester and avoided contentious issues such as the 
withdrawal of Russia’s military presence.” 127 In other words, while the Ukraine-brokered 
“settlement proposal” portends to have found an acceptable path towards resolution, in 
reality this plan brushes aside the most contentious issues in favor of garnering everyone’s 
approval.     
It is obvious from changes in both Georgia and Moldova that Russia’s influence in 
each country has diminished.  Closer relationships with Western governments (or with 
countries that are moving towards Western governments, such as Ukraine) and continued 
pressure on Russia from international organizations mean that Russian dominance in former 
Soviet countries is being replaced, just as Russia feared.  All the same, it appears that for the 
time being Russia is holding its ground (literally and figuratively) in both Georgia and 
Moldova and will continue to do so until it becomes politically advantageous for Russian 
troops to withdraw. 
 
Power Retention or Resented Aggression? 
 Russia’s decision to involve itself in the Georgian and Moldovan conflicts stirred 
speculation of a return to the imperialistic tendencies of Russia’s past as an empire and as the 
center of the Soviet Union.  Russian troops went to Transdniestria and Abkhazia to protect 
 
127 Stuart Hensel, ed., “Country Report: Moldova,”  The Economist Intelligence Unit, London: The 
Economist Intelligence Unit, October 2005: 15-16.  
63
vital interests on its borders and Russophone/Russia-friendly populations.  This response was 
greeted by the Georgian, Moldovan, and other governments around the world as an 
infringement on Georgian and Moldovan sovereignty.  Russia was one of the few countries—
indeed, the only country, at first—to provide assistance to the Georgian and Moldovan 
governments when they petitioned for help in countering secessionist forces in Abkhazia and 
Transdniestria.  However, the biased nature of Russian support has made its intentions 
suspect from the beginning.   
 Regardless of the suspicions other countries have had about Russia’s intentions, the 
Russian government had a purpose for, and rationale behind, its intervention.  More than ten 
years after its initial involvement in both Abkhazia/Georgia and Transdniestria/Moldova, 
however, one has to question whether or not Russia’s military activities and political 
maneuvering accomplished everything the Russian government hoped it would, or if Russia 
could have retained just has much power and influence in the former Soviet Union without 
sending troops to Georgia and Moldova. 
 In a paper written for the European Policy Centre entitled “Russian Foreign Policy 
with Special Reference to its Western Neighbors,” authors Fraser Cameron and Jarek M. 
DomaXski comment that Russian foreign policy concepts since the fall of the Soviet Union 
have been dominated by the desire to develop “strategic partnerships and good relations with 
CIS neighbors, on a bilateral and multilateral basis…”128 Cameron and DomaXski also 
observe that “Russia wants to play the role of an independent, economically viable player on 
the international stage—to be an ‘autonomous factor’ as its representatives often say—and is 
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determined not to be dominated by any superpower or ‘global policeman.’”129 While these 
statements refer to foreign policy goals outlined long after Russia’s involvement in Georgia 
and Moldova began, they describe, rather succinctly, Russia’s rationale for its actions in the 
two conflicts.   
Russian troops sent to Abkhazia/Georgia and Transdniestria/Moldova, in addition to 
securing an influential role in each conflict and the opportunity to flex Russian 
“peacekeeping” muscles, were intended to demonstrate that Russia’s government and 
military were capable of dealing with any task that might arise in Russia’s “sphere of 
influence.”  In some cases Russian troops did create a physical barrier between the warring 
parties and in other cases these troops were responding to attacks against the Russian army 
itself.   
However, several reasons explain why Georgia and Moldova were insufficient 
avenues in which to prove that Russia was still a viable, powerful force in its own right.  
First, at the same time that news about Russia’s military engagement in Georgia and 
Moldova was spreading, news about the poor state of Russia’s post-Soviet military condition 
was beginning to filter out as well.  As the world became aware of decaying munitions, 
underpaid (or unpaid) and poorly trained soldiers, and the general disorganization that 
reigned in much of Russia’s armed forces, it would have taken more than a show of muscle 
in a couple of regional conflicts in former Soviet states to convince the world that Russia 
remained a great power.  
Nowhere has the above decrepitude of the Russian military been more on display than 
in ongoing battles between Russia and Chechnya, its own breakaway region.  Russian and 
Chechen soldiers have been fighting almost continuously since the collapse of the Soviet 
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Union, and the Russian army has been accused of numerous human rights atrocities.  The 
Chechen situation plagues Russia’s lofty power goals from the standpoint of its military.  
More generally, Russia has continued to try to forcibly retain Chechnya while backing 
separatists in Georgia and Moldova and attempting to secure these regions’ independence.  
The realization of this rather hypocritical stance, as well as the consequences that victorious 
separatist groups in Abkhazia and Transdniestria could have on Russia’s own fight with the 
Chechens was credited, at least partially, with Russia’s transition from separatist support to 
peacekeeping.130 Even Russia’s attempts to rectify this contradictory policy have not stopped 
its military involvement in all three conflicts—Georgia, Moldova, and Chechnya—from 
undermining its efforts to re-exert itself as an influential regional and world power. 
Finally, Russian military engagement in Georgia and Moldova did little to increase 
the influence of what many consider to be Russia’s sole remaining trump card in the power 
game: its large nuclear weapons stockpile.  While some of these weapons (and other Russian 
military equipment) remained scattered throughout former Soviet republics, sending 
additional Russian troops to Georgia and Moldova to fight on the side of the separatists did 
little to change the status of the munitions that were in these countries.  As it was, Russia 
supplied both Abkhaz and Transdniestrian separatists with some of these weapons when 
fighting broke out, and nuclear weapons—and Russia’s general nuclear power capabilities—
continue to be a source of power on which Russian politicians can draw when the need 
arises. 
If Russia hoped to increase its influence and viability on the world stage, then, it does 
not appear that its military activities in Georgia and Moldova were very effective.  Not only 
have Russia’s actions failed to bring any kind of conclusion to either conflict, but its 
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continued involvement in both Georgia and Moldova is increasingly interpreted as 
unnecessary and meddlesome.  Russia’s military presence in both of these countries has 
continually done more to harm Russia’s image abroad than to help it as Russia fails to live up 
to internationally-broadcast commitments to withdraw its military from Georgia and 
Moldova. 
When the fledgling Russian government decided to intervene in the conflicts in 
Georgia and Moldova, it was acting in its own best interests, as all governments do.  The 
relative ineffectiveness of Russian intervention, however, leads one to question whether or 
not the Kremlin’s decision was the best possible response.  The respect and trust the Kremlin 
could have garnered by choosing a different method of engagement would have done more to 
benefit Russia’s image than its military activities did.  As has been shown in this thesis, 
however, Russia’s policy-making capabilities were skewed by a number of factors: poorly 
organized, competition-ridden, personality-driven domestic politics; the need to define 
Russia’s post-Soviet position in the world; and the Kremlin’s desire to continue asserting its 
dominance in the near abroad, where Russia had been the central power for so long.   
As the Russian government struggled to surmount these difficulties, conflicts in 
Georgia and Moldova provided a seemingly perfect arena in which to reinforce the desired 
image of undiminished strength and influence.  Russia saw that successful involvement in 
Georgia and Moldova would provide several benefits regardless of whether its initial support 
for the separatists or later for the Georgians/Moldavians succeeded.  Separatist victories in 
Abkhazia or Transdniestria would have provided outposts of Russian support against an ever-
expanding NATO and the drift of former Soviet republics towards the European Union.  On 
the other hand, Georgian and Moldovan efforts that triumphed with Moscow’s help would 
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foster greater Russian influence in both of these countries.  Once again, Russia would 
succeed in strengthening its influence in the former Soviet sphere.   
In reality neither outcome transpired.  Russian support for Abkhaz and 
Transdniestrian separatists faltered when it became apparent that Russia could acquire more 
influence in the near abroad by helping Georgia and Moldova.  Over the last decade, 
however, Russian influence has diminished rather than increased due to the installation of 
new governments in Georgia and Moldova and international pressure the withdrawal of 
Russian troops.  Russian intervention in each conflict, developed by a domestic political 
situation that was conducive to coherent, well thought out policies, was based on a set of 
assumptions.  The failure of these assumptions and consequent failure of Russian policy was 
the consequence of a set of policy options that was skewed from the outset.   
It has been mentioned at several previous points that Russia’s installation of 
“peacekeeping” forces in Moldova and Georgia was, initially, the only response to Georgian 
and Moldovan pleas for help.  When the international community failed to respond at first, 
Russia attempted to fill the gap; today, however, organizations like the OSCE and specific 
member countries are willing and able to take over the management of peacekeeping in both 
Abkhazia/Georgia and Transdniestria/Moldova.  This is not what the Russian government 
wants.   The continued expansion of the European Union and NATO, along with new 
westward-leaning governments in former Soviet states has done enough damage to Russia’s 
ability to influence countries that have traditionally been in its sphere of influence.  Yielding 
its central role in either the Abkhaz/Georgian or Transdniestria/Moldovan conflicts would be 
like simultaneously accepting defeat for its policies in these two countries and
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acknowledging that the foothold of Russian power is shrinking further than the government 
ever wanted it to. 
If Russia really wants to maintain some semblance of its former authority in Georgia, 
Moldova, and the rest of the post-Soviet bloc, it has a couple of non-military options.  The 
Russian government could throw its weight into ensuring that programs suggested by the 
OSCE or negotiated by participating parties are fulfilled.  Acting as advisors for 
multinational conflict-resolving or peacekeeping forces would demonstrate the Russian 
government’s ability to work with Western governments to find solutions to problems, even 
when those problems are in Russia’s traditional sphere of influence.  Such collaboration 
could also prove useful in that it might provide Western governments with the incentive to 
cooperate with Russia on other issues that are important to Russian policy makers.   
One of Russia’s major justifications has been that it knows more about this region 
than any outside power ever could; Russia must capitalize on this expertise and use it to take 
a leading role in helping to develop a settlement to these conflicts that really works. The 
Russian government’s desire to retain power and esteem in the region and in the larger 
international community could be slaked if Russia acted independently to find a peaceful 
solution to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova.  Independent, genuine attempts to reach an 
agreement with all sides would show that the Russian government has retained the ability and 
clout needed to be a major regional and international player.   Such a shift in Russian policy 
will be difficult to achieve, especially given that Russia’s actions in its near abroad have, up 
until this point, been focused on retaining or creating allies rather than overall stability.  
More broadly, expecting the Russian government to engage in these drastic policy 
recalibrations might be unrealistic in a world political system that still relies heavily on a 
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country’s ability to show, usually militarily, how strong it is.  Engaging in activities that 
contribute to existing endeavors to resolve the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, or in 
pursuing resolutions independent of the international community would raise Russia’s 
standing, however, by showing that even though the Soviet Union no longer exists, Russia is 
still able to act competently and capably in addressing its own needs and those of its 
neighbors.  By drawing on its wealth of knowledge and experience in the near abroad, then, 
the Russian government could provide for itself some of what it has sought since the Soviet 
Union collapsed: an influential position in its region and power and esteem in the eyes of the 
rest of the world.  
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